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Aura, Self, and Aesthetic Experience
  Marshall Battani 
Abstract
Aesthetic experiences are generated in encounters with
cultural objects and such experiences are marked by the free
play of cognitive and numinous experience unstructured by
concepts. Kant’s famous three types of pleasure, made
infamous in social theory by Pierre Bourdieu, are examined in
relation to the critical theoretical concept of aura, the social
psychology of “flow,” and cognitive explanations of perception
to explain experience in aesthetic fields.  Theories of aesthetic
experience developed at the crossroad of critical social thought
and cognitive science hold promise for a social analysis able to
avoid the usual sociological pitfalls of either ignoring aesthetics
or reducing it to structurally determined differences of taste.
Key Words
aesthetic experience, aesthetic field, aura, cognition, cultural
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1.  Introduction
Why do people flock to movie theaters to see remakes of old
films and sequels to recent ones knowing full well that, in all
likelihood, what they are about to see will pale in comparison
to their first go around?  Why is unrequited love such a
compelling feature of our favorite stories?  What drives (so-to-
speak) such large numbers of people to an interest in NASCAR
super-speedway racing?  Why do so many people try to hold
on to the past with their family snapshots?  How is it that the
people of one culture find such a wide variety of things
compelling?
Sociology, especially cultural sociology because of its penchant
for examining esoteric high culture alongside the more
quotidian, is a likely source for an answer.  Unfortunately,
despite its promise, the typical sociological explanation is often
superficial.  Most of the time sociology simply tells us that
there is variation within the cultures of societies, often even
enough variation to allow for different recognizable cultures or
subcultures and, because of this variation, we are able to see
a variety of groups or audiences for different cultural objects. 
Thus the notion “different strokes for different folks” is
elevated to the status of sociological explanation.[1]
I am, of course, being more than a bit too dismissive, but as a
cultural sociologist myself, I feel somewhat entitled.  These
issues are more complex than my quick dismissal implies, and
notably so, because the idea of societies filled with different
taste cultures has been given critical import by Pierre
Bourdieu’s notion of distinction, an idea that has been more
influential to the sociological study of art and culture than any
other in recent years.  No cultural sociologist’s toolkit is really
complete without his concepts of capital, and a good
understanding of their interplay upon and within social actors’
life trajectories.  When it comes to art, specifically, Bourdieu
shows us in excruciating empirical detail the irony in how the
dominant aesthetic of disinterestedness works very much in
the interest of society’s powerful.[2]
This paper looks to another level of analysis, one that is
simultaneously more general in its applicability across groups
and institutions and more interested in common individual
level aesthetic experience as opposed to the social
consequences of taste.  Why do people flock to see film
remakes, revel in romantic longing, or watch the Daytona 500
on television?  Questions like these are addressed here by
briefly examining typical sociological approaches to art and by
looking at the idea of “fields” and aesthetic fields in particular. 
Although sociologists tend to treat aesthetic fields as they
would any other, I will argue that they are unique and what
sets an aesthetic field apart from others is aesthetic
experience. 
My explanation of aesthetic experience, in turn, draws from
cognitive theories of self, the human desire for numinous
experience (often culturally coded as spiritual or enlightening),
the critical theoretical concept of aura, and the idea of “flow”
developed in social psychology.  To make this argument it will
first be necessary to rescue Kant from current sociological
misinterpretations.  Rather than censuring the notion of
disinterestedness or simply identifying the differences between
the audiences for different cultural objects, the effort here is to
suggest some possibilities for understanding fundamental
similarities cutting across the institutions and life-worlds
inhabited by different audiences.  How might one understand
the larger context – an aesthetic field - in which the taste for
disparate objects and the desire for certain experiences exist?
2.  Social Worlds and Art Worlds
It is difficult for sociologists to give aesthetic analysis its due.
Sociology typically takes one of two approaches to aesthetics,
neither of which contributes to an understanding of aesthetic
experience.  One common approach, the production of culture
perspective, championed by Richard Peterson and canonized in
Howard Becker’s Art Worlds, takes an agnostic position on
aesthetics.  According to Becker
Aesthetic principles and systems, being part of the
package of interdependent practices that make up an
art world, will both influence and be influenced by such
aspects of it as the training of potential artists and
viewers, financial and other modes of support, and the
mode of distribution and presentation of works.  They
will especially be influenced by a pressure for the
consistency implicit in the idea of art.
With such a statement Becker (and I doubt very much he
would disagree with me for saying so) leaves the definition of
aesthetics to someone else, to the participants of the art world
in question.[3]  In the production of culture tradition, an art
world is a sub-category of social world, defined (like all social
worlds) as diffuse networks of people with a patterned variety
of interaction with one another.  The patterns of interaction
are directed toward some shared goal, but the definition of
that goal and the means to achieve it are much less rigidly
defined than they would be in, say, a business organization. 
Everyone involved in an art world is connected somehow or
other, and the job of the sociologist is to describe the complex
and sometimes ambiguous patterns of interaction that emerge
as participants go about defining, creating, judging,
distributing, appreciating, and whatever else they do in relation
to art.
3.  Fields, Artistic Fields, Aesthetic Fields
The second major sociological approach to studying art that
became dominant after the English translation of Bourdieu’s
Distinction in 1984 examines taste as a component of powerful
and exclusive social forces that establish and maintain status
hierarchies.  In Bourdieu’s approach a theory of fields stands in
for the descriptive concept of social world.  An artistic field is
defined as a system of social positions structured by power
relations in which social actors struggle over the appropriation
of economic, social, and cultural capital.[4]  In other words
social actors in an artistic field (in any field really – think of the
legal professions for example) seek advantage through the
influence of wealth (economic capital), their social networks
(social capital), and their taste for and knowledge of those
aspects of culture that confer honor and esteem (cultural
capital).  In this scheme, because status distinctions are
associated with appreciation of high culture, Kant’s formulation
of the disinterested attitude of aesthetic contemplation
becomes a tool of domination.  In Bourdieu’s eye, learned
practices of disinterested contemplation of cultural objects
serve to camouflage what is, in fact, highly interested action
directed, not necessarily consciously, toward deploying and
legitimizing power and domination.[5]
After Bourdieu there really isn’t much doubt that our art
institutions and practices reproduce and reify social structures.
 But isn’t it possible that even if aesthetic practices have a
structuring power, Kant had it right in describing
experience?[6]  Surely it is. It is especially so if we take
seriously just how Kant conceptualizes the act of judging as
opposed to the judgment itself.  The judgments themselves
are bound by concepts, constrained by social forces, while the
process of judging is something else, something Kant calls the
free play of cognition not determined by concepts.[7]  Judging
something to be pleasurable or good (the two “interested”
judgments posed against the “disinterested”) requires some
set of concepts and sense of purpose.  One knows the
pleasurable in relation to what one knows of one’s self, and
certainly knowing what is good requires some objective sense
of rules and concepts.  The beautiful, on the other hand,
animates cognition (just as do the good and the pleasurable)
but does so free of any sense of purpose, free from concepts
that guide interpretation and constrain meaning.  This is the
nature of purposiveness without purpose and it is this sense of
the aesthetic that is ignored or too easily dismissed by the
sociological imagination still under the influence of
Bourdieu.[8]    
Bourdieu, in his rather simplistic inversion of Kant, wants us to
believe that the pleasures of judging are more fully realized,
not in cognitive play but in directed, concept-driven
contemplation with a sociological purpose.  Pleasure comes
from the interest in discovering that which “makes the [art]
work necessary” or, in other words, how the particular artistic
field creates the conditions that fundamentally shape
expression.[9]  But when Bourdieu is talking about the
pleasure to be had from delineating the contours and textures
of some artistic field or other (in the quotation above it’s
Flaubert’s literary field), he is talking about a particular kind of
discovery that might result from an aesthetic experience but
he isn’t talking about the experience itself.  (Again, he thinks
we ought to be leery of the disinterested experience as it
masks what is actually going on.)  There is something
fundamental and experiential being ignored if all we do is talk
about the concepts and awareness that derive from an
aesthetic encounter.
So how do we talk about the experience?  Janet Wolff’s
definitive statement on the dilemmas with, and the need for,
situating aesthetic considerations within sociological analysis
certainly nudges us in the right direction.[10]  She recognizes
correctly that Kant is important to developing aesthetic
sociology not only because he figured prominently in
twentieth-century debates about, and defenses of, high
modernism, but equally because, having relatively little to say
about exactly what art is, he instead developed an
understanding of the aesthetic attitude.  Such an approach,
because it is focused on peoples’ experiences rather than on
cultural objects alone, is, at least intuitively, open to the
sociological imagination. 
Kant’s particular focus on the disinterestedness fundamental to
aesthetic experience has been criticized for being impossible
and, according to Wolff, phenomenological theories of art, like
those of Natanson and Morawski, have been better at
explaining the nature of aesthetic experience per se.[11] 
Arnold Berleant provides phenomenological insight as well.  He
asserts that  “…the phenomena of aesthetics reach to the very
source of perception and meaning in direct experience.”  He
provides a detailed description of the particular characteristics
of the aesthetic field as “The total situation in which the
objects, activities, and experiences of art occur” and argues
that the experience of art is fundamentally bound up with the
social world “…in spite of the tendency of modern aesthetics to
build barriers against the incursions of political uses, social
conventions, moral orthodoxies, and cognitive
significance.”[12]  Wolff would like us to understand that art is
both bound up with the social world and autonomous:
Art has its own specificity, first, in the relatively
autonomous structures, institutions, and signifying
practices which constitute it, and through which it
represents reality and ideology [and] art also retains an
autonomy with regard to the specifically aesthetic
nature of the apprehension and enjoyment of works of
art. [13]
She sees promise in theories of discourse that allow us to
understand how we constitute aesthetic experiences as we talk
about them, and in psychoanalytic theories for explaining the
desire and pleasure underpinning aesthetic experience.  But
the difficulty remains, she concludes, in bringing these
approaches together with the sociological “obligation” (her
word, not mine) to investigate empirical phenomena, the
“specific social and historical conditions of aesthetic experience
and evaluation.”[14]
4. Aura
An examination of the critical theoretical concept of aura and
the social psychological experience of flow sheds light on how
one might meet what Wolff calls the obligation to investigate
empirical phenomena of aesthetic experiences.  Whether it is
brought on by a painting, sculpture, film, monument, celebrity,
or natural phenomenon one sometimes experiences an almost
inexplicable wondrous feeling and the word “aura” seems to
capture it.  But aura is much more than a simple label for
some mystical or pseudo-mystical experience. 
The idea of aura as it is developed most famously by Walter
Benjamin is, frankly, confusing.[15]  Nevertheless, what is
clear from his various descriptions of the phenomenon is that
aura is experienced as a collapse of the distinction between
proximity and distance.  Originally art objects were dependent
on ritual and were thus only ever fleetingly available. 
Ceremonial practices such as rites of passage and communion
demonstrated that ritual objects were set off from daily life
and yet, at the same time, the fate of one’s daily life was
intimately bound to them.  In the modern era of autonomous
art, objects were freed from their “parasitical dependence” on
ritual and their literal uniqueness, their status as originals
enshrined in museums, imbued them with an appearance of
distance.  Adorno builds upon Benjamin’s ideas by framing the
collapse of proximity and distance as a dialectic of
interpretation and indeterminacy.[16]
For Adorno, artworks are puzzles in the sense that they are
indeterminate in their nature and thus make possible the free-
play of the mind.  The indeterminacy of a puzzle both evokes
and allows for interpretation, and artworks, as puzzles, are
enigmas in that they both speak and conceal.  They create a
dialectic of proximity and distance as they point beyond their
obvious apparent meaning and invite interpretation, while also
confounding and even refusing it.
According to Yvonne Sherrat we then have a characterization
of aura in which it is (from Benjamin) “an appearance of
distance” and (from Adorno) a fundamental indeterminacy
inherent in the object.[17]  The indeterminate nature of the
art object leads to the appearance of distance and also to the
experience of aura that helps make an object both meaningful
and beyond interpretation at the same time. The simultaneous
invitation and refutation of interpretation leads to intense
engagement with the art object and, according to Adorno, this
intense receptivity creates the ultimate proximity in the loss of
self as Ego to the object or image.  One looses conceptual
faculties, the cognitive boundary around the self, and the very
sense of self associated with ego. The Id remains, as self, and
it is this that merges with the art in an aesthetic experience.
5. Aura and Self:  Flow
In one of the relatively few attempts to study aesthetic
experience empirically Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson
surveyed and interviewed art professionals in an attempt to
better understand aesthetic experience and ultimately to
propose methods to enhance individuals’ aesthetic
encounters.[18]  Early on in the project the authors
recognized that the aesthetic experiences described by the
subjects of the study sounded very much like an already well-
studied state of consciousness given the name, “flow” by
Csikszentmihalyi in 1975.[19]  Flow is a commonly used term
that describes an exceptional state of consciousness:
Athletes refer to it as “being in the zone,” religious
mystics as being in “ecstasy,” artists and musicians as
aesthetic rapture. Athletes, artists, and mystics do very
different things when they reach flow, yet their
descriptions of the experience are remarkably
similar.[20]
Flow describes a kind of total immersion in an activity and the
accompanying state of consciousness in which all one’s
experiences are in harmony.
This state of harmony, described both as being at one with
one’s self and as losing one’s self, occurs when people are
doing things that they feel are worth doing for their own sake. 
The optimal experience occurs when a person perceives that
there is something for her or him to do, some challenge, and
also feels that she or he has the skills to meet that challenge
(or to come very close).  This relative balance of challenge
and skills drives a person having a flow experience toward
increasing challenges and levels of complexity in order to
maintain the heightened consciousness.  Flow facilitates and
motivates action in the form of cognitive play.  Consequently,
flow is often associated with a sense of discovery.  One
discovers new skills and new senses of self. Such experiences
typically occur while engaged in activities that have clear goals
and boundaries, and within these boundaries one’s sense of
the “outside world” is abandoned, one experiences a sense of
power and control over the outcome of the activity, and time
becomes distorted.  George Herbert Mead’s “me” is completely
overshadowed by the “I:”
In flow the self is fully functioning, but not aware of
itself doing it, and it can use all the attention for the
task at hand. At the most challenging levels, people
actually report experiencing transcendence of self,
caused by the unusually high involvement with a system
of action so much more complex than one usually
encounters in everyday life.[21]
In the words of Csikszentmihalyi, one has an “autotelic”
experience – one that is intrinsically rewarding (it has purpose
without purpose).
Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson describe the rewards intrinsic
to encounters with works of art and, because these
descriptions are similar to descriptions of flow, the researchers
ask us to consider aesthetic experience as a form of flow. 
Four dimensions of an aesthetic encounter emerge from the
study and they include 1) the perceptual – an experience of
physicality, 2) the emotional – including a wide range of
emotional responses, 3) the intellectual – an experience of a
relatively closed or open-ended meaning, and 4)
communication – in the form of a kind of dialog with the
artwork or in the form of information about an era or culture. 
Art professionals tend to become skilled (they “mature”) in one
or more of these dimensions. 
In an aesthetic encounter one’s attention is arrested for
whatever reason and then one’s skills are applied to the
encounter.  As challenges are met, attention is refocused at a
higher or more complex level and the sequence begins again. 
New skills open up new challenges, which facilitate attention. 
Attention is focused at a higher level, which helps develop new
skills to meet new challenges.  Just as one begins to grasp the
meaning (or whatever dimension upon which one’s attention is
focused), the challenge is renewed:  the piece escapes one’s
grasp and one is compelled to stay engaged.  (The object
evokes and allows and frustrates contemplation.)  While the
thing that triggers this experience is certainly socially and
historically dependent, the dialectic form of the resulting
cognitive experience may not be; it may be an experience
that, as Kant would say, is free of concepts, disinterested.
6. Aura and Self:  the Numinous
How is such a “non-conceptual” experience possible for human
beings?  As fundamentally social and reflexive beings, it just
doesn’t seem plausible that we might, individually or
collectively, be able to experience the sort of matter-of-fact
wonder and mystery of aura as described by Benjamin and
Adorno and documented more contemporaneously as “flow.” 
Harry T. Hunt takes up a closely related set of questions in his
examination of what he refers to, following Rudolf Otto, as the
“numinous.”  In Hunt’s words (drawing from Blofeld), “…the
core of numinous or mystical experience lies in its
nonconceptual, directly felt realization of an immediate sense
of Being, presence, or ‘thatness’ – also related to the sheer
‘suchness’ of Zen satori experience.”[22]  According to Hunt an
encounter with the numinous is an experience of being itself
and understanding such an experience requires a multi-level
conceptualization of the self.
Hunt draws from the work of developmental and cognitive
psychologists to illustrate multiple levels of self including: 1) a
primary “ecological” or “bodily” self basic to perceptual-motor
navigation, 2) a self-referential or social sense of self and, 3)
a “meta-cognitive,” “noetic,” or introspective capacity that
allows for the representation of “inner” cognitive processes
and states of consciousness.[23]  The fact that the human self
is spread across the central nervous system in this way
confirms, according to Hunt, William James’ conclusion that a
sense of self is unattainable by our self-referential awareness
and as such it is only in the ongoing stream of consciousness
that the human self might be found.  Experience of one’s sense
of self is thereby set up at the fringes of reflexive
consciousness and remains inaccessible via our self-aware
conceptualizations.  The self, like the auratic artwork described
by Benjamin and Adorno, is both proximate and distant –
inviting interpretation while refusing it.  In formal terms an
encounter with aura is much like experiences with the
ecological self that disappears the moment we begin to name
it and reflect upon it.
James Gibson’s theory of what he calls our “ambient ecological
array” helps illuminate how such experiences of the ecological
self take on the significance that they do.[24]  Gibson
describes human perception as the sensory activity involved in
navigating through one’s “perceptual surround.”  As Hunt
summarizes:
Such active navigation creates an open horizon ahead,
out of which streams ambient gradients of surfaces and
textures, which, closing behind the moving organism,
continuously specify or self-locate its presence within a
self-generated “envelope of flow.”[25]
Sentience is essentially self-location.  Environment and self are
co-specified without reflection in ecological perception.  This
notion, associated with third-generation cognitive science
represents what some call a radical embodiment of
consciousness and is sometimes derided as “cockroach
intelligence” or “phenomenology without a head.”
Nevertheless, Nagataki and Hirose show that this kind of
simple level intelligence effectively explains sentience as
ecological self engaging the world in action (they use
McBeath’s example of the baseball outfielder who engages
directly with the environment via a “dynamic coupling” of
subject and object as he moves toward the ball and the ball
moves toward him).[26]
By adding the cognitive understanding of sentience to the
already well-developed sociological understanding of the
symbolic and socially constructed self, we can understand that
the metacognitive and introspective hallmarks of the reflexive
self involve spatial metaphors derived from the ecological
array.  This is why, according to Hunt as well as Lakoff and
Johnson, we so regularly employ basic physical metaphors like
“center/periphery, high/low, inside/outside, and varieties of
kinesthetic ‘forces’” in our attempts to conceptualize the
nature of our being in the world.[27]  Should we be able to
bypass or perhaps intensify these metaphors that mediate
direct experience of the ecological self, we may become open
to the mystical and ecstatic experiences associated with the
dissolve of the boundary between one’s self and the world.  In
such cases “[t]he ecological self reemerges as a ‘presence’
coordinated with an ‘openness’ of the encompassing array that
is typically ‘schematized’ culturally as God or Absolute.”[28]  It
should take no great leap to imagine this sort of experience of
the “absolute” as on a continuum with the aesthetic experience
described by Adorno, in which the self (as Ego) is lost and then
“merges” with the art as the self loses its sense of self, its
social and introspective dimensions, in favor of its primary
ecological functioning self.
7. Aesthetic Fields
An aesthetic field, like any other sociologically defined field, is
a system of social agents acting in relation to others. 
Following Berleant, we can think of the total field as including
objects and the perceptions and experiences of the actors, as
well.[29]  It is the particular nature of these aesthetic
perceptions and experiences that differentiates an aesthetic
field from other fields.  Objects in the environment generate
aesthetic fields as people become engaged with them in
cognitive play.  What might motivate such an engagement is
highly variable and an aesthetic field might more likely be
generated in an art world, but one can emerge anywhere an
object speaks to someone in such a way as to generate the
experience of aura and flow.  Kant, of course, identified
experiences of pleasure in the agreeable and pleasure in the
good (in which reflective and introspective dimensions of self
are operating), but if an aesthetic field is generated, then
one’s social sense of self and place drop away in favor of free
play unconstrained by concepts (Kant), a loss of self (Adorno),
or flow (Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson).  Social-psychological
theories of field phenomena argue that perception and
perception of one’s self are wedded in what John Levi-Martin
describes as a “theoretically rich dualism.”[30]  Aesthetic
experience untangles this dualism potentially creating insight
on one’s own perceptions of self.
What does any of this have to do with the questions asked at
the beginning of this essay?  Well, maybe what interests
people who go to see remakes, revivals, and sequels is not the
quality of the sequel or the original but the act of evaluation
itself.  It isn’t about the outcome but the process of comparing
the two and the repeatedly experienced fact that the second
may come close but will ultimately fail to capture the wonder
of the first.  This tension experienced as movie-goers evaluate
and argue about what they have seen creates an
intensification of the metaphors blocking direct experience of
the ecological self, spatial metaphors as in “how close  is one
version to another?”  The intensity of these debates or self-
evaluations, if not literally bringing one closer to numinous
experience, at least puts one into a field in which the potential
for the numinous (the bridging of opposites, self and world) is
experienced, metaphorically, in the possibility and impossibility
of reconciliation between the original film and its remake or
sequel.  This experience is, in turn, formally equivalent to the
tension created by an artwork’s invitation to, and refusal of,
interpretation.  The possibility of flow or an aesthetic
experience has been created.
If there is any potential for a field theory of aesthetics, then
the aesthetic experience ought to be visible in a variety of
different institutional contexts and across genres.  So,
following the questions posed at the beginning of the essay,
what is it that draws people to watch NASCAR races on
television, particularly ones taking place at the legendary
super-speedways in Daytona and Talladega?  Inevitably, the
hours-long broadcast will revolve around the ability or inability
of drivers and their crews to get their cars “dialed in.”  On
these enormous tracks the fastest cars are those that find a
tenuous balance between a car that floats over the surface of
the track (at speeds around 200mph) and yet still has enough
friction to steer itself through the corners.  The effort to find
that balance continues throughout the race and provides the
broadcasters with a structure upon which to build their
commentary.  A variety of adjustments to the suspension of
the car and to the air pressure of the tires in relation to the
changing temperatures of the racing surface and the length of
runs between adjustments are discussed in detail, as is the
relative success of each team.  The perfect balance is an
impossible goal simply because of the unpredictability of the
wide array of variables at play. 
Experiencing the dramatic struggle to “dial in” is equivalent to
the aesthetic/auratic experience of proximity-through-
distance.  The condition itself is beyond attainability:  a state
suspended between friction and no friction.  Some have
described the super-speedway cars as “[very] low-flying
aircraft.”  But if they actually fly they will crash and if they
maintain contact with the track they are doomed to be slower
than might be possible.  The struggle to dial-in, like the
unrequited love of Romeo and Juliet, is an embrace of the
experience of proximity through distance, the effort to obtain
the unobtainable, to interpret the unintelligible, to know the
unknowable.
A very different activity, the creation and collection of family
snapshots, can be similarly described as an experience of the
formal characteristics of proximity through distance.  Susan
Sontag addresses this issue in her popular writing by
employing the idea of melancholy.[31]  Sontag is concerned
with how people make meaning in light of the apparently
direct, but always partial, connection that the photograph has
to the world.  The connection to the world in front of the
camera is paramount, but at the same time photographs are
not transparent and direct reproductions of the world. 
Photographs, for Sontag, are meaningless without
explanation.  The act of explanation, of providing context and
guiding interpretation of the image, is a process that takes
place in time, and time inevitably distances the image from
the world it depicts.
The play of loss and recovery in much of Sontag's
interpretations also plays a central role in the work of the
literary critic and theorist Roland Barthes.  Barthes describes
photographs as sites of personal and cultural experience.[32] 
While looking at a photograph, the viewer has a set of cultural
conventions or "codes" with which to find meaning, but
photographs have a way of challenging those codes.  Barthes
referred to this phenomenon as an ever-present tension in the
process of interpreting photographs between the studium (that
which is culturally coded) and the punctum (that which is
not).[33]  Reflecting his post-structuralist semiotic theories of
culture and language, Barthes shows, through his own
idiosyncratic reading of numerous photographs, that
photographic meaning is indeterminate.  Though meaning is
indeterminate and the possibility of finding it is always
tenuous, the desire to find it is, in Barthes’ view, constant and
unrelenting. Photographic meaning is elusive to the point of
indeterminacy and the effort to find it is an aesthetic
experience.
Examples of this form of aesthetic experience are also
available from the worlds of Western high culture.  Yonatan
Malin has examined how the use of syncopated or displaced
dissonance reinforces the theme of romantic longing that is
the hallmark of the German Romantic Lied form.[34]  The
distance and proximity collapse that is experienced emotionally
in melancholic romantic yearning as a kind of frustrated
melodic closure becomes analogous to unrequited love.  Much
analysis of eighteenth-century bourgeois culture addresses the
distance and proximity between novel expression and the
constraints of form.  See, for example, Witkin on Adorno and
classical music, McClary on the sonata form, and Moretti on
the literary form of Bildungsroman.[35]  Kurt Konigsberger
makes similar analyses through a comparison of Arnold
Bennett’s novel, Anna of the Five Towns, from the early
twentieth century, to the popular animated television show,
The Simpsons, from the end of that century.[36]
These few brief examples from film, auto racing, photography,
music, and literature hint at the potential of a field theory of
aesthetics to incorporate cultural objects from a variety of
social and cultural strata and the experiences of a variety of
social actors into one compelling explanatory framework. 
Romeo and Juliet are almost united.  The sequel is close but
not quite as good as the first installment.  Stock cars very
nearly fly.  Snapshots almost recreate a moment in time, and
the syncopated dissonance of melancholy music leaves one
longing for resolution.
8.  Conclusions
The relationship between auratic form and a socially
constructed value given to the desire for the numinous
experience described above and the brief description of its
operation across genres suggests that we can at least
entertain the notion that treating aesthetics as a field
phenomenon can push the social analysis of art and culture
beyond the typical sociological approaches that either ignore
aesthetics or focus only on their consequences for social
stratification.  The trick lies in creating a sociological
imagination for Kant – in conceptualizing the disinterested
attitude in terms of social psychology and cognition.
There are those who would have us believe that sociologists
simply ought not to tread on such rarified territory as
aesthetics.  According to Nick Zangwell, for example, the
application of sociology to the study of art has a de-
aestheticizing effect.  Although Zangwell’s characterization of
the sociological literature and sociological reasoning is largely
specious, his central concern, “[t]he idea that [art world]
participants might have a motive for participating has slipped
from view” is valid and so too is his assertion that “[w]e need
a theory that gives a good explanation of why people create
and consume art.”[37]  The pursuit of numinous experience
generated in flow may provide such an explanation.
Kant’s cognitive free play and the critical theorist’s experience
of aura meet at the crossroads of cognitive science and social
psychology to direct our understanding of aesthetic experience
toward social-psychological conceptions of the self and its
sense of being in the world. In the aesthetic field generated by
one’s interaction with a cultural object, we can see the
pleasures of Kant’s cognitive free play and the critical
theoretical potential of aura as one’s experience of flow
generates numinous experience and consequently the potential
to reflect upon the relatively fleeting nature of such an
experience.  This reflection opens up potentially new
perspectives on one’s social self, on its presence and its
absence, and thus taps into the power of self-awareness.  The
idea of the aesthetic field presented here is sociological
without being reductionist. It can embrace the social and
cultural variation of a range of settings which may generate
aesthetic experience while granting that experience some
autonomy and acknowledging the possibility that the form of
the experience is dictated as much by cognitive structure as it
is by social structure.
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